access to that reality. Bernardo and I are booked in to debate the Consciousness Live YouTube channel later this summer. This chapter asserts that panpsychism is not a form of materialism. Phenomenally conscious states involve subjective experience. My concern with analytic idealism is that there seem to be two explanatory gaps at its core. Nonetheless, Hoffman also argues that we haven’t got direct (or even indirect?) He opposes that position to panpsychism and to Kant’s transcendental idealism. Of course this may be terminological pedantry in that, to Hoffman, the noumenal isn’t in fact noumenal at all. Leading philosophers at HowTheLightGetsIn Global. There’s a good chance that none of the theories currently being proposed are correct. “brains and neurons do not exist unperceived”, “most proponents of the Copenhagen interpretation embrace it only for the microscopic realm”, https://www.paulaustinmurphyonphilosophy.com/, http://poetrycomedyandstuff.blogspot.com/. This includes not only human and animals, but inanimate objects such as rock and atoms. That’s all fine as it stands, but giving an evolutionary account of the adaptive value of the emergence of sensory consciousness isn’t the same thing as giving an account of how the emergence actually happens. But that fact is compatible with many theories of consciousness. Hoffman hardly mentions it. That said, he’s hardly the first person to have done so (see here). According to cosmopsychism, there is one fundamental conscious subject: the universe itself. But I don’t think it helps our cause to misrepresent the view we oppose. The mind versus the heart. Bernardo can’t assume without argument that dissociation alone is sufficient to produce a new subject because that would be to assume without argument the truth of his view. The approaches of dualism and idealism can be seen as alternates to panpsychism too, but certain varieties are complementary. Consciousness is fundamental.”. Instead, panpsychists believe that there’s consciousness (or there are phenomenal properties) all the way down to the particle and all the way up to the animal brain. It isclaimed that Thales went m… (Indeed Hoffman himself mentions the Copenhagen interpretation on a few occasions and at one points says that “most proponents of the Copenhagen interpretation embrace it only for the microscopic realm”.) In fact, in my first book I defended a cosmopsychist form of panpsychism and the view I am currently developing is a form of cosmopsychism. Bernardo defends a form of idealism: roughly the view that the physical world is grounded in a more fundamental, mind-involving reality. Whatever is “behind” (or the cause of) our perceptions is not itself dependent on consciousness (or on our perceptions). 'Can panpsychism explain why the universe is fine-tuned for life?' For it is panpsychism that is physically incoherent, whereas analytic idealism is not only consistent with both microphysics and neuroscience, it even helps to make sense of a number of their observations. Here, I will primarily mean what philosophers call phenomenal or qualitative consciousness. There certainly seems to be some irreconcilable differences between BK's premise and PG's own. Why would the fact that some of my experiences become causally connected up in a certain way entail that a new conscious subject appears? Thus if consciousness has been with the universe (as it were) since the Beginning, then the issue of the emergence of consciousness becomes a non-problem. To be clear: I reject materialism as much as Bernardo does. Because panpsychism encompasses a wide range of theories, it can in principle be compatible with reductive materialism, dualism, functionalism, or other perspectives depending on the details of a given formulation. In addition, what does Hoffman mean when he states that brains and neurons “have no causal power”? In his post-discussion blog post, Bernardo gave some interesting responses to my charge of an explanatory gap between thoughts and sensory qualities: We witness the modulation of qualities by other, different qualities every day: our thoughts constantly modulate our feelings, and the other way around. 100% Upvoted. And yet we know there is more than one mind: there are at least 7.5 billion of them. Panpsychists aspire to account for human and animal consciousness in terms of more fundamental forms of consciousness. Staying undecided and undefined instead of latching to ideology. The problem is that they don’t exist as the sun, planets, tables and chairs. Before human and animal subjects emerged, on Bernardo’s view, all of the experiences of the universal mind were cognitively integrated, in something like the way the experiences of a human mind are cognitive integrated. First, the mind in all things is something internal to, or inherent in, things themselves (as opposed to being injected or sustained by some outside entity). It could be that naturalistic dualism is true, and there are fundamental psycho-physical laws governing this transition. Hoffman will deny this and he’ll do so for various reasons. That is: i) If we describe things as “brains and neurons”. They simply argue that tables and chairs (or their many parts!) Panpsychism, the view that consciousness is fundamental to reality, is gaining new support in science and philosophy. ii) and those descriptions are contingent — and dependent — upon persons/observers, concepts, theories, etc.. iii) then perhaps we may as well conclude that brains and neurons “do not exist unperceived”. Already a subscriber? Consider the following analogy. (Though DNA is determined by — and dependent upon — quantum phenomena.) there is no such detectable substrate that is not an experience within consciousness. join now (only takes a moment). My approach is via survival metaphysics. Both interpretations of panpsychism imply that every inanimate object has its own subjective inner life. He states: “Conscious realism, together with MUI [multimodal user interface] theory, claims that tables and chairs are icons in the MUIs of conscious agents, and thus that they are conscious experiences of those agents. Actually, I prefer idealism to panpsychism, my personal opinion is that reality is analogous to a computer program being computed by consciousness. I turn now to Bernardo’s own view: analytic idealism. It's actually quite straight forward, in that BK's premise is that there is a realm outside of personal mentation, but that realm is entirely mental in nature, and what we experience as 'matter' is nothing but a experiential representation of transpersonal mental states. I hate to say it because the answer is 20th-century philosophical handbook knowledge: the big alternative came with the so called linguistic turn: the step into the world of statements. If there was just one mind, and that mind came to have certain of its experiences inferentially isolated from the others, all that would logically follow – in the absence of some further principles of nature – is that there is one mind with certain experiences inferentially isolated from the others. Perhaps this is a bad example because at least DNA is a microphenomenon, if not a subatomic phenomenon. Secondly, not all — or even most — scientists “believe that space, time, and objects exist even if they’re not perceived”. (That is, all the way down to particles and all the way up to human beings.) In addition, if conscious realism really “offers a scientific theory of the noumenal”, then it’s not the noumenal that it’s offering a scientific theory of. In a general sense, panpsychism may be defined as the view that all things possess mind, or some mind-like quality. Again, I’m not convinced that things are so cut and dried. But it doesn’t seem to me at all plausible that the former could be deduced from the latter. Hoffman’s main problem with Immanuel Kant’s position on noumena is that he believes that it’s not scientific. The thing is that Hoffman makes the Copenhagen interpretation seem idealist nature. Most of the objections Bernardo has put forth against panpsychism seem to be directed at the reductionist version. According to analytic idealism, at the fundamental level there is a single conscious subject: the universal mind. All this displays the very common problem of conflating (or confusing) idealism and anti-realism. Instead, some panpsychists would say that tables and chairs are made up of entities which contain (or instantiate) “phenomenal properties/qualities” (or “(proto)phenomenal properties”). Nonetheless, he does mention the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics favourably. Hoffman then makes various distinctions between his own position of conscious realism and panpsychism. These two commitments, in conjunction with Leibniz’s law (if X and Y are identical, then X and Y share all of their properties), entail that conscious states have causal efficacy: (A) Conscious states are identical with physical brain states(B) Physical brain states have causal efficacy(C) if X and Y are identical, then X and Y share all of their properties(D) Therefore, conscious states have causal efficacy. The fact that panpsychism admits of these two interpretations already deflects one of Bernardo’s criticism, namely that it employs a particle ontology, which Bernardo takes to be utterly refuted by contemporary science. The answer is that we believe that fundamental physical properties are forms of consciousness (more on how to make sense of this here). However, when they are perceived, then they’re given (as it were) a determinate form — a form which is down to our contingent theories, experiments, perceptions/observations, concepts, languages, etc. As J… Put simply. Panpsychists aspire to account for human and animal consciousness in terms of more fundamental forms of consciousness. I maintain, therefore, that there is a profound explanatory gap at the heart of Bernardo’s view. So this isn’t that unlike people using mathematics and scientific terminology to defend — or back up — astrology, astral travelling, ley lines, Creationism, etc. Hoffman often applies the Copenhagen interpretation to the “classical” (or macro) scale. Consciousness is fundamental to panpsychists in the sense that all things have various degrees of consciousness (or experience). are conscious or that they instantiate (whatever that may mean) experience or “phenomenal properties”. So what does all that mean? Philosophy of Consciousness • Idealism • Dualism • New Mysterianism • Neutral Monism / Panpsychism 9. The objections he raises are certainly powerful challenges, but there are some very good responses to these kinds of challenges, and these responses have not been conclusively refuted. (More of which in a moment. That is: i) If we have consciousness all the way down to particles. One of the first Presocratic philosophers of ancient Greece,Thales (c. 624–545 BCE) deployed an analogical argument for theattribution of mind that tends towards panpsychism. For example, there are panpsychist versions of idealism where fundamental microphysical entities are conscious subjects, and on which matter is realized by these conscious subjects and their relations. I’m not 100% sure what ‘modulation’ means. Thus he believes that he can offer a scientific theory of it. The world isn't in your head, the world is your head. Or, less strongly, he believes that Kant’s position doesn’t look promising from a scientific perspective. However, one part of Hoffman’s story does seem to chime in with panpsychism. As consciousness researchers, we can hope that the theories we sketch today are precursors that the final theory of consciousness will build on. Idealism: One-to-one mapping of physical entities and object-minds, but object-minds do not necessarily exhaust the mind of God. Standardly, physicalists hold that: (A) Conscious states are identical with physical brain states(B) Physical brain states have causal efficacy. Intelligence and symmetry in nature and what it might tell us about reality What I haven’t heard from Bernardo is an objection to non-reductionist panpsychism. (This raises the question: What does Hoffman mean by “agent”?). All the additions to that are examples of speculative philosophy. Thus these two positions fit perfectly well together. Read Bernardo's response here. Indeed, the panpsychism that survives the criticisms is analytic idealism minus … Christians believe that God became man, and hence that God had a physical body. Whilst many physicists do prefer to think in terms of fields, there are empirically adequate particle-based interpretations of physics. And it’s certainly less grand that claiming that tables and chairs are conscious agents. Thalesnotes that magnets and, under certain circumstances, amber, can movethemselves and concludes that they therefore possess minds. Hoffman’s position can be seen as a take on panpsychism in that he states that “consciousness is fundamental”. Hoffman says that Kant believed that. My objection was that disassociation doesn’t entail the existence of a new subject in any sense. (I don’t use the term “qualia” here because that will lead to unclarity.) Panpsychism and Buddha-nature. Yet, we know that it does occur; all the time. Firstly, the fact that subset of a conscious subject’s experiences become disassociated from the rest of its experiences does not seems to me to necessitate the existence of new conscious subject. Yet, as is the case on so many occasions, anti-realism is basically seen as idealism (or, at the least, as a variety of idealism). If there was just one mind, and that mind came to have certain of its experiences inferentially isolated from the others, all that would logically follow – in the absence of some further principles of nature – is that there is one mind with certain experiences inferentially isolated from the others. panpsychism: One-to-mapping of physical entities and minds. It's our nature of duality. Thoughts feel completely different than feelings, so there is an obvious qualitative transition taking place when this modulation occurs. Panpsychism is the view that mind or soul is a universal feature of all things; this has been a common view in western philosophy going back to the Presocratics and Plato. Bernardo then tries to account for human/animal consciousness in terms of disassociation, a process through which a subset of the universal mind’s experiences cease to be cognitively integrated with the whole whilst remaining cognitively integrated with each other. According to D. S. Clarke, panpsychist and panexperientialist aspects can be found in … Both interpretations of panpsychism imply that every inanimate object has its own subjective inner life. As Bernardo puts it (p. 140 of this): If we take the human psyche as a representative sample of how cosmic consciousness operates — which is the best we can do, really — we can infer that, ordinarily, these phenomenal contents are internally integrated through cognitive associations: a feeling evokes an abstract idea, which triggers a memory, which inspires a thought, etc. Sort by. Marcus Aurelius: How To Live Without Fear, Beyond resilience: Toward ‘antifragile’ urbanism, On Definitions of the Word ‘Consciousness’ (1). I think Bernardo ought to agree about the importance of giving constitutive as well as historical explanations. (Admittedly, that’s a question of the very existence of space and time and it has nothing to do with our perceptions.) There are obvious similarities to cosmopsychism, but the difference is that for the analytic idealist the universal mind is a reality which underlies the physical world, whereas for the cosmopsychist the universal mind is the physical universe. I ask that question because he doesn’t explain it in the passages just quoted (though he may well do elsewhere). It’s hard to see how there could be an intelligible transition from abstract thoughts to the rich qualities of sensory experience: colours, sounds, smells and tastes. (This is exactly what Bishop Berkeley argued; thought not, of course, about “brains and neurons”.) I begin with some necessary background details concerning contemporary panpsychism and the problems it faces, and then proceed to the theory itself. This disassociated set of experiences, in virtue of its disassociation from the universal mind, then becomes a conscious subject in its own right. (Bernardo continued this disagreement in a blog post he wrote following our debate; I have counter-responded in this blog post.). (Three words which many panpsychists often use together — see here.) There’s a good chance that none of the theories currently being proposed are correct. Sign in with Facebook, Twitter or Google to get started: Physicalism is the belief system of Artificial Intelligence..... we must cling to notions of inner consciousness and unpredictability like all life itself depends on it...as it does! And he strongly distinguish his own position from transcendental idealism. Panpsychism, Idealism, and the unified conscious energy of the universe. Primarily, Hoffman will do so because he does indeed believe that there’s a “reality” out there. But merely attending to our experience doesn’t reveal to us the metaphysical underpinnings of our being set up in this way (just as empirical reflection on cases of dissociation doesn’t reveal to us its metaphysical underpinnings). My objection wasn’t that disassociation doesn’t entail the existence of a new fundamental subject, or a new subject disconnected from the universal mind. Instead, we’ve only got access to the contents of consciousness. Key Difference – Pragmatism vs Idealism Pragmatism and idealism are two opposing philosophical approaches. Despite that, only the mathematical models or “formulations” used in conscious realism are scientific (or mathematical). Donald Hoffman’s philosophical position is called conscious realism.He opposes that position to panpsychism and to Kant’s transcendental idealism. Clear indications of panpsychist doctrines are evident in early Greekthought. It’s only when she actually has a red experience that she can gain this knowledge. Take this passage: “The story that there was first the Big Bang and then, billions of years of later, life, and then, hundreds of millions of years later, consciousness, is fundamentally wrong. iii) Idealism and Anti-Realism iv) Kant’s Transcendental Idealism v) The Copenhagen Interpretation. Bernardo objects that none of the equations of physics refer to qualities, which he takes to entail that: if physicalism is true, qualities have no role to play in the causal story of the universe. Panpsychism suggests that everything has a mind. There are also cosmopsychist versions of idealism where the whole universe is conscious, and on. This piece argues that Hoffman’s conscious realism is a new-fangled take on idealism (i.e., it’s idealism with self-conscious mathematical and scientific knobs on). Philip’s defense entails blurring what the term ‘panpsychism’ means to the point of making it a subset of analytic idealism. There’s also a big difference between the stress on how we gain access to (as it were) reality and the idealist position that it’s all about what goes on in one’s head. Many Muslims believe that it’s impossible for God to become man. Whereas, PG's premise is that there is a realm out there, but that realm consists of some notion of a detectable substrate, as in QFT, that inherently has consciousness. The micropsychist works within a particle-ontology interpretation of physics, and identifies basic forms of consciousness with the physical properties – mass, spin, charge, etc. It doesn’t follow that we’re wasting our time. In addition, they aren’t the contents of consciousness. So let’s reiterate what’s just been said above (i.e., before the subheading). In our debate, Bernardo responded to this point by saying that, according to materialism, consciousness has no causal efficacy, and hence its presence could not possibly be conducive to survival. Professor Donald Hoffman is explicit about his position on panpsychism. There are broadly speaking two ways of doing this: reductionist and non-reductionist. Of course many current theorists disagree.”, The wording in the above isn’t quite right. That route leads to idealism, subjectivism, solipsism and woo. But I don’t think it helps our cause to misrepresent the view we oppose. – of fundamental particles. The main difference is that whilst panpsychists think that the physical world is fundamental, idealists think that there is a more fundamental reality underlying the physical world. For example, it could just be a basic law of nature that in cases of dissociation new subjects emerge. Or if we’re thinking in terms of cosmopsychism: a basic law of nature that when the conscious universe is in a certain state, consciousness corresponding to certain of its parts emerges. Panpsychists tend to think of consciousness (or phenomenal properties or experience) as being “fundamental” in the sense that it exists all the way down and all the way up. In other words, disassociation doesn’t entail that there is more than one mind. Indeed, the most influential argument against physicalism, the knowledge argument, would seem to support me in this contention. To repeat. I don’t think we can make sense of an identity between a qualitative state of consciousness and a purely quantitative physical state. For example, here’s Hoffman applying it to DNA: “For instance, [conscious realism] entails that DNA does not exist when it is not perceived. peaceful feelings of kindness). It is important to note here that material things are “real” in that that exist outside any one consciousness, … Gnosticism and its problematic philosophical outcomes. I’m really looking forward to continuing the discussion! “[c]onscious realism, by contrast, offers a scientific theory of the noumenal, viz., a mathematical formulation of conscious agents and their dynamical interactions”. Having said that, what Hoffman himself argues doesn’t make this distinction clear. panpsychism vs idealism, This difference between panpsychism and Idealism/Nondualism is critical: the former proposes fragmentation as the fundamental reality, while the latter proposes unity, fragmentation being just an illusion arising from dissociative processes. Similarly, if qualitative pain is identical with quantitative c-fibres firing, then qualitative pain has all the same causal powers that quantitative c-fibres firing has. And there’s no way around that. Hoffman, on the other hand, stresses the fundamentality of consciousness by writing it into the story at the Big Bang (actually, just after). Surely it’s best to say that some things (whatever they are) exist mind-independently. Bernardo is an idealist and I’m a panpsychist. But there are important differences. Elsewhere, however, Hoffman applies exactly the same argument to brains (as a whole), cups, trees, and other everyday macro-objects. Regarding the physics, I think things are not as cut and dried as Bernardo thinks. The core thesis of that argument is that Mary in her black and white room cannot deduce what it’s like to see red no matter what physical information she has. Hoffman then expresses a position that isn’t at odds with either anti-realism or Kant’s transcendental idealism. I’ve tackled it here.). The starting point of the theory is the assumption that an all pervading cosmic consciousness is the single ontological ultimate. I regret that we didn’t get a chance to discuss this more, as I think this response misunderstands my objection. 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